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A Note on the Distinction Between Oral
and Written Defamation
by Jack G. Day*
I.
T MAY BE TRUE, IN THE MAIN, that the life of the law, "has not
been logic; it has been experience." Nevertheless, the Courts
occasionally develop rules of law with no apparent animation
from either. An Ohio decision, Pecyk Adm. v. Semoncheck, 61
Ohio L. Abs. 465, 105 N. E. 2d 61 (1952), Motion to Certify over-
ruled May 7, 1952, Gongwer's St. Rep. (Ohio) No. 9210, Page
11442 furnishes a recent example of one such development and
the provocation for yet another examination of the basis for the
distinction between written and oral defamation.
The facts of the Pecyk case are these: The Political Action
Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations for Cuya-
hoga County, Ohio was meeting to consider the endorsement of
candidates for Cleveland City Council.
Under the procedure of the Political Action Committee the
Executive Committee recommended candidates subject to a con-
curring vote by the entire committee composed for the most part
of representatives from local unions throughout Cuyahoga
County.
The Executive Committee recommendations called for the
endorsement of the opponent of Anthony Pecyk, candidate for
Council from the 10th Ward. When it appeared the Committee
might not follow its executive's recommendations, the defendant,
Semoncheck, took the floor and said in substance:
"I know Tony Pecyk's father [i.e. Walter Pecyk] for 24 years
and I know he is a Communist or Communist sympathizer
and I can prove it." (Brackets supplied.)
Support for candidate Anthony Pecyk, immediately dropped
away. He was not endorsed. His opponent was. Pecyk lost the
councilmanic race by 170 votes in a poll totalling 7340.
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The estimated attendance at the meeting was 85 persons. The
total of the constituencies of those representatives present is un-
known but certainly some large multiple of 85. Decisions made
at the Political Action Committee meetings were to be reported
by the representatives to their respective locals.
Walter Pecyk filed an action for slander. However, he died
before trial and the pending action abated. His son, and ad-
ministrator of his estate, pursued the surviving cause of action on
behalf of the estate. Ultimately, a jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and finding
no proof of special damage, entered final judgment for the defend-
ant. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to grant a motion to
certify.
Comparable defamation in writing had been held libelous
per se in Ohio. Ward v. League for Justice, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 197,
93 N. E. 2d 723, Motion to Certify denied 154 Ohio St. 369 (1950).
And it is noteworthy that two of the three Court of Appeals
Judges who sat in the Ward case participated in the unanimous
decision in Pecyk v. Semoncheck, supra.
The opinion in the Pecyk case was remarkable in several re-
spects. It followed the traditional view that actions in slander
must be supported by proof of special damage unless falling with-
in one of the categories which is classified as slander per se, 1
adopted as its own the proposition that the slander spoken of
Pecyk was of the " 'grossest and most scandalous character,'" and
apparently agreed that it would be difficult "'to put into words, a
charge, which, if believed, would more certainly exclude from
society * * * or more surely expose * * * to public odium and
disgrace.' "2 Nevertheless the scandalous matter spoken of Pecyk
was held not to be slander per se.
Thus the decision makes the narrow distinction between oral
and written defamation the touchstone of recovery (absent
slander per se or special damage) regardless of the medium used
to defame or any other circumstances surrounding the Act.
"Words which tend to subject a person to public hatred, ridi-
cule or contempt, are actionable per se, if written, but such
" 'I. The words must import a charge of an indictable offense, involving
moral turpitude or infamous punishment, or
II. Impute some offensive or contagious disease calculated to deprive
the person of society; or
III. Tend to injure * * * in his trade or occupation."' Pecyk vs. Semon-
check, supra, 466-467, 105 N. E. 2d at 62.
2 Pecyk v. Semoncheck, supra, 467-468, 105 N. E. 2d at 63.
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words when orally spoken do not give rise to an action in
slander per se." (Citing cases.) Pecyk v. Semoncheck, supra,
467.
With the law in this posture, the Ohio Courts can be ex-
pected to rule that a defamer extemporizing over the air to a
national radio or television audience is not responsive in punitive
damages unless the words uttered happen to defame the object
of the slander in his profession, charge an indictable offense, or
impute a dread disease.3 However, should the same defamer read
the identical words from a script, he may commit libel per se and,
without proof of special damage, his victim may recover. The
distinction has been so applied in another jurisdiction.4
An Ohio case, Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers, 54 Ohio
App. 40, 45-47 (1934) 5 provides an example showing how far the
distinction can be pressed. A general manager of the Ohio Public
Service Company committed libel per se in taking a copy of a
letter from his pocket and reading parts of it to an assembly of
persons. Had he recited from memory or paraphrased the de-
famatory content leaving the copy in his pocket, the action would
have been for slander and proof of special damage necessary to
recovery. For the Court said:
"* * * the only object in reading the charges was to have
them believed. Therefore, if what the company did con-
stituted libel as distinguished from slander, then there was a
right of recovery without proof of special damages."
"* * *,The General Manager wrote and published the defama-
tory matter * * * that * * * publication was libelous and
* recovery could be had without proof of special dam-
age." 6
3 Impugning the chastity of a female may provide a fourth category of
slander per se. See Stevens v. Handley, Wright 122; Crider v. Goodman,
3 0. L. A. 117; Barnett v. Ward, 36 0. S. 107.
4 In Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, affirmed 253 App. Div. 887, 2 N. Y. S.
2d 1015 (1937) oral interpolations by a radio script reader were ruled
slanderous only and the complaint defective in the absence of an allegation
of special damages since the words spoken were not slander per se. Later
cases e.g. Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 73 N. E. 2d 30 (1947) supplied
the logical corollary holding that words not slanderous per se were libelous
because read over the radio from a prepared script. A comparable issue was
raised and seriously discussed in the celebrated Remington v. Bentley, 88
F. Supp. 166 (1949). However, the rule of that case did not depend upon
the distinction between oral and written defamation because on the facts
there was an obvious injury to Remington in his profession.
5 Cf. The Case of Scandalous Libels, 77 Eng. Reports (Rep.) 250 (1610)
where it was said that a libel might be published by maliciously repeating or
singing it in the presence of others.
6 Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers, supra, at 46, 48.
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111.
Holdsworth has said that the earliest case to distinguish oral
from written defamation was King v. Lake, Hardres, 470 decided
in 1670 in which the distinction was mounted in terms of the
greater "malice" which written defamation "contains." He sug-
gests that the improvement of action on the case as a remedy for
defamation, the suppression of dueling and the status of written
defamation as a crime all combined to shape the distinction. 7 The
Restatement concludes that competition between common law
and ecclesiastical courts and an inheritance from Star Chamber
jurisdiction account for the distinction.8 The social context of the
time may also have played a part. For in restoration England
recollections of social upheaval and the role of propaganda were
fresh. Printing had a permanent effect in the sense that the oral
word did not; and it was the only medium at the time for trans-
mitting ideas in anything like simultaneous, widespread and
identical form. The savagery of the censorship measures the
official estimate of the power of the printed word.9
In any event, by 1812 the development of the distinction had
progressed so far that Mansfield, C. J. regretfully concluded in
Thorley v. Kerry that an "indefensible conclusion" was neverthe-
less established.'0
Mansfield's views have a special force because stated before
modern technology provided facilities so expanding the audience
for oral defamation as to make the range and effect of ancient
printing presses seem ridiculously feeble.
He said:
"* * * I am very sorry that it was not discussed in the Court
of King's Bench, that we might have had the opinion of all
twelve judges on the point, whether there be any distinction
as to the right of action between written and oral scandal; for
myself after having heard it extremely well argued, and
especially, in this case, by Mr. Barnewall, I cannot upon
principle, make any difference between words written and
spoken, as to the right which arises on them of bringing an
7 Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 41
L. Q. Rev. 13, at 16.
s See Restatement, Torts Vol. IM § 568, 160-162.
9 See Trevelyan, English Social History, Longnmans Green & Co., Inc. 1942,
262.
10 Taunton's Report 355.
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action. For.the plaintiff in error it has been truly urged that
in the old books and abridgments no distinction is taken be-
tween words written and spoken. But the distinction has
been between written and spoken slander as far back as
Charles the Second's time, and the difference has been recog-
nized by the Courts for at least a century back. * * * In the
arguments, both of the judges and counsel, in almost all
cases in which the question has been, whether what is con-
tained in a writing is the subject of an action or not, it has
been considered, whether the words if spoken, would main-
tain an action. It is curious that they have also adverted to
the question, whether it tends to produce a breach of the
peace but that is wholly irrelevant and is no ground for re-
covering damages. So it has been argued that writing shows
more deliberate malignity; but the same answer suffices, that
the action is not maintainable on the ground of malignity,
but for true damages sustained. So, it is argued that written
scandal is more generously diffused than words spoken, and
is, therefore actionable; but an assertion made in a public
place, as upon the royal exchange concerning a merchant in
London, may be much more extensively diffused than a few
written papers dispersed or a private letter;1 it is true that
a newspaper may be very generally read but that is all casual.
These are true arguments which prevail on my mind to
repudiate the distinction between written and spoken scandal;
* * * if the matter were for the first time to be decided at
this day, I should have no hesitation in saying, that no action
can be maintained for written scandal which could not be
maintained for the words if they were spoken." (Emphasis
supplied.)
No doubt Mansfield would agree with a later writer that the
reasons for the distinction are "rather respectable from their
antiquity than cogent for their inherent soundness; * * *" 12 His
opinion also suggests that the whole distinction may be based on
mistake ("in the old books and abridgements no distinction is
taken between words written and spoken"). History suggests it
may be an invention. 13 Certainly the reasons which Holdsworth
11 The trial judge in the Pecyk case, supra, stated a similar conclusion from
the vantage point of modern times:
"The Court: * * * I am inclined to agree that it would be much more
injurious for a person to get on a national radio hook-up and extempo-
raneously and orally charge * * * that one is a Communist than to
write a letter * * * saying the same thing. You have only a technical
distinction. (R. 59-60.)"
12 Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 L. Q. Rev. 255, 258.
13 Cf. Restatement, supra Note 8; at 160-161.
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attributes to those Courts which developed the. distinction had
little to do with the rationale usually stated.
14
The authors of the Restatement of the Law of Torts are
persuaded that "no respectable authority has ever attempted to
justify the distinction on principle * * *" 5
III.
In resolving the practical problem created by the effect of the
still current distinction between oral and written defamation
upon a plaintiff's obligation to prove special damages, at least
four approaches are possible.
The first is to expand the varieties of actionable words within
one of the established categories of slander per se.
The second is to expand the categories of slander per se.
The third preserves some nexus with the distinction but at-
tempts to connect it to rational considerations and proceeds, case
by case, to distinguish libel from slander in terms of tests such as
the area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated char-
acter of publication, and the persistence of the defamatory con-
duct.16
A fourth proceeds more boldly to interpret the law in terms
of current technical fact and modern circumstance and to cease
recognizing a distinction which new techniques have made ab-
surd. This tack is approved by implication in Devany vs. Quill,
187 Misc. 698, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 733 (1946) although the decision in
the case does not depend on dropping the distinction. There the
defendant said of the plaintiff, a candidate for public office, that
he was "The agent of Fascism in America today" and "The agent
of Hitler in America." The Court took the position that if the
distinction still existed in New York State, it made no difference
to the case because the words were actionable per se.
Of the distinction, however, it was said at page 704:
"why written defamation * * * should be deemed libel per se
and oral defamation should not be regarded as slander per se
is not easy to perceive. The natural and necessary tendency
of defamatory imputation to inure is the same in both cases.
14 See Holdsworth, supra at 16.
15 Restatement, supra note 8, at 160.
16 Cf. Restatement, supra at 163.
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* * * In Louisiana, the distinction has been rejected; and all
oral defamation is actionable without proof of special damage,
on the same principles as written defamation (36 C. J. Libel
and Slander, Sec. 29, p. 1116; Prosser on Torts, 808-809)."
The first two remedies do not meet the logical problem which
the distinction raises. Rather they bend around it in a deflection
which may decide a particular case but does not generalize a
logical rule. The third attempts an analysis of circumstance and
effect and in doing so, makes the distinction hinge upon certain
factual determinations which if made, justify the more extensive
remedies historically associated with libel. This has the merit of
gauging the remedy by the effects of the wrong. However, unless
this remedy is coupled with the complete discard of the me-
chanical application of the distinction its effect will be reduced.
The fourth and last, paradoxically, returns to a history older than
the distinction in coming up to date. In dropping the distinctior
it changes little beyond equalizing the requirements for proof of
damages in defamations which are exactly alike except in form.
IV.
The doubt that the distinction ever rested on principle is as
great in Ohio as elsewhere. But if it ever did, time and technical
advance have thoroughly undercut it. Nevertheless, it is now a
part of hoary tradition and it is apparent that the remedy in Ohio,
if it comes at all, will have to originate with the legislature.
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